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Abstract 
This paper is about the "Three Strikes Law" in New Zealand. The Paper will explain the 
social background of its introduction, the present arrangement in New Zealand and will 
consider whether this arrangement breach the Bill of Rights Act and if it is compatible 
with the principles of sentencing. 
Subjects and Topics 
Three Strikes Legislation 
Sentencing 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 
Sentencing Act 2002 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents and bibliography, footnotes) 
comprises approximately 14991 words. 
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I Introduction 
"Three strikes and you are out". 
This expression comes from baseball where a batter is out after the third st1ike. But 
"three strikes and you are out" is also a metaphor for a practice of sentencing in c1iminal 
law. It means that a pruticularly hard punishment follows two previous crimes. 
On l June 2010, New Zealand established a fonn of the three st1ikes in its Sentencing 
Act 2002 with the Sentencing and Parole Refom1 Act 20 l 0. 
This paper will show the social background of the adoption of the three strikes law, the 
aITangements of the Act and its development. Fmthennore it will show the inconsistency 
of the Act with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and with the 
purpose and principles of sentencing. 
II History and Social Background for the Adoption of the "Three Strikes 
Law" in New Zealand 
The basic idea of the "three st1ikes and you're out" law is nothing new. It is a form of 
mandatory sentences which means that the sentencing com1 has only one option in its 
sentence. 
To impose a longer p1ison sentence on repeat offenders in comparison to first time 
offenders who commit the srune crime can be traced back to the colonial period in the 
United States. 1 Fmthennore, mandatory sentences existed for a wide range of offences 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.2 
A fonner regulation of mandatory sentencing can also be found in New Zealand. 
Indefinite imprisonment of three time convicted felons was included in New Zealand's 
Habitual Criminals Act 1906.3 
1Craig Carpenter "Three Strikes and You ' re Out in New Zealand: Getting tough on violent crime or get 
tough political rhetoric?" (2010) Rethinking Crime and Punishment <www.rethinking.org.n z>. 
2 Neil Morgan "Capturing Crimes Or Capturing Votes? The Aims And Effects OfMandatories" (1999) 
22 UNS W Law Journal 267 , at 267. 
1 Craig Carpenter, above n I . 
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The first three strike legislation, as we understand it today, was established in 1993 in 
the state of Washington. This three strikes law provided no exceptions for the sentencing 
in the third strike. The initiative to this law was made by the Washington Citizens for 
Justice, a group of relatives of victims of crime.4 The background to the promotion of 
the idea of a three strikes law was the death of Diana Ballasioted, who was abducted and 
stabbed to death by a convicted rapist on work-release from prison.5 Finally, the three 
strikes law was introduced in a statewide ballot in November 1993 by an overwhelming 
majority. 6 California was the next state to establish a form of three strikes law. The Bill 
passed with a majority of 72%. Today 24 jurisdictions in the United States have enacted 
different versions of the three strikes law, that is, 23 states and the federal govemment. 7 
A significant factor contributing to the adoption of the three strikes law in New Zealand 
was the ACT party. The focus of ACT is taxation and c1ime. 8 The idea of the adoption 
of the three strikes legislation was part of its law and order policy for the General 
Election in 2008.9 Following the election, the National Party agreed to support the three 
strikes Bill through the Select Committee stage. 10 
The ACT paity got its idea for the three strike law from a group of relatives of victims, 
the Sensible Sentencing Trust (SST). 11 The background to the emergence of the idea of a 
three strikes law is thus the same as in the 1990s in the United States: a civil group of 
relatives of victims. Another reason for the idea of the three strikes law is that for a 
decade a movement to more and more interest in crime policy in the media and the 
public has emerged. 12 The voices speaking for more punitive sentences and longer 
penalties have grown steadily. 13 Interesting in this context was a referendum initiated by 
the SST in 1999. The question of this referendum was: 14 
4 Ibid, at 2. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Lyn Hinds "Three Strikes And You're Out In The West: A Study OfNewspaper Coverage Of Crime 
Control In Western Australia" (2005) 17 Criminal Justice 240, at 240. 
8 Craig Carpenter, above n I, at 13. 
9 Sophie Klinger "Three Strikes For New Zealand? Repeat Offenders and The Sentencing And Parole 
Reforn1 Bill 2009" (2009) 15 Auckland UL Rev 248 at 248. 
10 Ibid, at 249. 
11 Craig Carpenter, above n 1, at 16. 
12 Sophie Klinger, above n 9, at 248. 
13 Ibid. 
14 lbid. 
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should there be a refom1 of our justice system, placing greater emphasis on the 
needs of victims, providing restitution, and compenstation for them and imposing 
minimum sentences and hard labour for all serous violate offences. 
This question was answered with 'yes' by a 91.75 per cent vote.
15 
At first glance, this 
result seemed to show that the public would like to have a change in the justice system. 
But at second glance, this result is not so clear anymore. Rather, the result of the 
question seemed to be highly influenced concerning the fact how the question was 
asked, it implied that the justice system does not cover the interest of victims. 
Fmthennore, the question covered a couple of issues and there was no option to agree 
with just one of them. 16 However, the referendum indicated to some degree the public 
mood smrnunding crimes. 
Furthermore SST and ACT often presented the idea of the three strikes law after a crime 
which had raised high media interest. Then the public was more open for such ideas.
17 
The discussion about c1imes and raising crime rates is often accompanied by "populist 
rhetoric and with the language of general deteITence and incapacitation". 
18 
The 
discussion around the "fight against c1ime" especially against violate offenders uses the 
fear of the public and is accompanied by notions that judges are not doing their job or 
that they are not being tough enough. 19 There are lots of examples from around the 
world for such rhetoric. One example outside of New Zealand is a situation in Germany 
in 2007 when Roland Koch, a well-known politician in Germany, put the fight against 
violent youth criminality on his agenda for the election in 2008 after two teenagers 
brntally attacked and nearly killed a 76-year-old man in Munich's underground. This 
case caused high media interest. In his election campaign, Roland Koch used rhetoric 
like "zero tolerance against violent offenders".20 A big pa.it of the public liked this kind 
of rhetoric. They believed that the juvenile criminal law is not tough enough although 
many expe1ts said that the present aiTangement were enough. This example clearly 
shows how politicians use cases of violent offences and the feai· and anger of the public 
about them to support their career, to get attention especially before elections. Moreover, 
15 Craig Carpenter, above n I , at 14. 
16 Ibid, at 15 . 
17 Ibid , at 16. 
18 Neil Morgan , above n 2, at 269. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Spiegel Online ,,Debatte um Jugendstrafrecht Koch warnt vor kriminellen Auslander" (2007) 
<www.Spiegel .de>. 
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it shows that they use general rhetoric rather than proved facts. This kind of rhetoric is 
easy to understand by the public and feed its hunger for retribution. 
The suppo1ters of the three stiikes law frequently used this rhetoric in the media and 
parliamentary debates.21 David Garrett, for example, talked about his experience when 
he met people in the pub while having a beer after working and talked with them about 
their thoughts about the current sentencing practice and the three strikes law model. He 
reported that these people liked the ideas of the three strikes law and harsher 
punishment. Furthermore, they would go a step fi.11ther and would ask him why the 
offenders got a second chance. He repo1ted that in their view, one strike would be 
enough; they would not give the offenders a second chance.22 But the rhetoric was 
unmasked by other politicians. Hon Clayton Cosgrove, for example, mentioned in his 
speech "'three strikes and you ' re out ' is a great slogan, is it not?".23 
However, as seen, topics around harsher punishment and as well the three strikes 
provisions are not just ways of dealing with crime, rather it is also a political instrument. 
III The Arrangement of the "Three Strikes Law" in New Zealand 
A Purpose of the Act 
The purpose of the Sentencing and Parole Refo1m Act 2010, as stated in cl 3, is to: 
B 
(a) deny parole to certain repeat offenders and to offenders guilty of the worst 
murders 
(b) impose maximum terms of imprisonment on persistent repeat offenders who 
continue to commit serious violent offences . 
Qualified Offences 
The legislation lists over 40 qualifying offences.24 The listed offences are mainly violent 
and sexual offences. Examples for included sexual offences are s l 28B of the Crimes 
Act 1986 (sexual violation), s 129 (attempted sexual violation and assault with intent to 
commit sexual violation), s 129A(l) (sexual connection with consent induced by 
threat)25 . Furthermore included are ss 172 to 175 (murder) as well as manslaughter 
2 1 
( 18 February 2009) 652 NZPD 1428-1429 . 
22 fbid , at 1424 . 
23 Ibid, at 1422 . 
24 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86A (a). 
25 Ibid . 
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(s 177). Examples for offences assaulting the physical integ1ity are s 188(1) (wounding 
with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) or s 189(1) (injuring with intent to cause 
g1ievous bodily harm). Moreover included in this catego1y is s 201 (infecting with 
disease). In addition to that, offences likes 208 (abduction for purposes of maiTiage or 
sexual connection) or s 209 (kidnapping) are included in the list of qualified offences. 
Finally, the robbe1y offences in ss 234-236(1) are included. 
These examples show that the three st1ikes law in New Zealand applies just in cases of 
really se1ious, violent offences. It is not like in some states of the United States that it 
would apply for a thefl:26 or other less serious offences. 
C First Strike 
The first strike is regulated in s 86B of the Sentencing Act 2002. The Act calls it "Stage-
1 offence: offender given first warning" . What a "stage-I offence" is, is defined ins 86A of 
the Sentencing Act 2002. It: 
is a serious violent offence [which] was committed by an offender at a time when 
the offender did not have a record of first warning .. . and was 18 years of age or 
over. 
What "serious violent offence" means can be found in s 86A. This section provides the 
official definition for "serious violent offence": it is committing any of the listed 40 
qualifying offences unless the context does not require another interpretation. It is cleai· 
from the design of the Act that "se1ious violent offence" as requirement for a stage-I 
offence means one of the listed offences. There is no sign in the context of the 
legislation, neither in the explanatory note or commentaiy to the Bills that another 
interpretation would be required . Rather it can be found in the commentaiy to the 17-2 
Bill that " se1ious violent offence" means one of the listed offences.
27 
The Act wants to 
provide a legislation which makes a list of offences applicable to the three strikes law. It 
does not want to open the door for interpretation by the Cou11 what a "serious violent 
offence" is in the paI1icular case. Rather, the framework of the three strikes legislation 
wants to provide a more mechanical situation. Because of that, there is no fUJ1her 
requirement or necessity for fu11her interpretation by the Court. If one of the listed 
26 So for example in California in Ewing v California , 538 US 11 (2003), where the offender Ewing had 
stolen three golf clubs wOJth $399 each. 
27 See al so Sentenc ing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 17-2 (Commentary) at 2. 
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offences is committed, it will automatically be a "se1ious violent offence" m the 
meaning of the three strikes law. 
A further requirement of the first strike is that the court warns the offender about the 
consequence28 . The Act does not require a special fonn of words for that warning, but it 
is required that the offender gets a written notice "that sets out the consequences" .29 
D Second and Third Strike 
For the second and third strike, the Act differentiates between murder and other 
offences. Applicable for other offences are s 86C (for the second st1ike) and s 86D (for 
the third strike). Applicable in the case of murder is s 86E, which regulates the second 
and third strike. 
(1) Other offences than murder 
(a) Second strike 
In the legislation, the second strike is designated as "the final warning" .30 It follows a 
second conviction of a qualifying offence. Necessary for such a "stage-2 offence" is: 31 
a serious violent offence . . . that was committed by an offender at a time when the 
offender had a record offirst warning (in relation to 1 or more offences) . 
"Se1ious violent offence" again means one of the 40 listed offences. There is again no 
sign that the context leads to another interpretation. 
To make it clear, the second strike is named "stage-2 offence" or "final warning". 
Characte1istic for a stage-2 offence is that it is a qualifying offence as stated in s 86A 
and that there is a fonner warning. "Stage-2 offence" does not mean that there are 
special offences which can be stage-2 offences. The offences are all the same listed 
offences as stated in s 86A. The difference between stage-1 and stage-2 offence is just 
whether there was a fonner warning or not. 
28 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86B(l )(a). 
29 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86B(4 ). 
30 Warren Brokbanks and Richard Ekins "C riminal injustice and the proposed "three strikes" law" (2010) 
<www.maxim.org.nz>. 
31 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86A(b). 
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Fm1her requirements for the "final warning" are that the Com1 warns the offender of the 
consequences and gives the offender a written notice of this warning.
32 
So this is the 
same requirement as for the first strike. 
In addition to that, the second sttike provides a special regulation with regard to parole. 
Therefore, the Act states that:
33 
( 4) If the sentence imposed on the offender for any stage-2 offences is a 
determinate sentence of imprisonment, the court must order that the offender serve 
the full tenn of the sentence and, accordingly, that the offender,-
(a) in the case of a long-term sentence (within the meaning of the Parole Act 2002), 
serve the sentence without parole; and 
(b) in the case of a short-te1m sentence (within the meaning of the Parole Act 
2002), not be released before the expiry of the sentence. 
This regulation is important because the judge has to impose a dete1minate jail sentence 
without parole in cases of long tenn sentences. In the case of a sho11 term sentence, a 
release before the expi1y date can not be ordered. There is no choice, no discretion by 
the judge. 
The meaning of sho11-term sentence and long-term sentence in the Sentencing Act and 
the Parole Act are similar. The definitions of sho11-term sentence and long-tenn sentence 
can be found ins 4 of the Parole Act 2002: 
short-term sentence means a sentence of imprisonment that is 
(a) determinate sentence of 24 months or less imposed on or after the 
commencement date; or 
(b) a notional single sentence of 24 months or less; or 
( c) in the case of a pre-cd sentence, a sentence of 12 months or less 
long-tenn sentence means a sentence of imprisonment that is-
(a) a detem1inate sentence of more than 24 months imposed on or after the 
commencement date; or 
(b) a notional single sentence of more than 24 months; or 
(c) an indeterminate sentence imposed before, on, or after the commencement date; 
or 
(d) in the case of a pre-cd sentence, a sentence of more than 12 months 
32 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86C. 
33 Ibid. 
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This means with regard to the three strikes law that in cases of a detetminate sentence of 
imprisonment of more than 24 months or a sentence of more than 12 months in the case 
of a pre-cd sentence (which means a sentence of imprisonment that is imposed before 
the commencement date) the judge has no option to order this sentence with parole. 
Subsection (c) does not apply because s 86C of the Sentencing Act 2002 applies just to 
dete1minate but not to indetenninate sentences. The consequence is that the offender 
who is subject to the sentence is not eligible to be released on parole. 
If the sentence is 24 months or less or 12 months or less in cases of pre-cd sentences, a 
release is not possible before the expity of the sentence. This means that a release of the 
offender is not possible before the date on which the offender has served the full term of 
the sentence and therefore ceases to be subject to the sentence. 
To summarize the consequences of the second strike: the offender will be sentenced as 
n·ormal but any determinate jail sentence will be served in full without the possibility of 
an early release. 
(b) Third strike 
Another conviction for a qualifying offence that is not murder finally leads to the third 
strike. Required for the third sttike is:34 
a serious violent offence . .. [that] was committed by an offender at a time when the 
offender had a record of final warning (in relation to 1 or more offences). 
Furthennore, the Act limits which courts can sentence an offender for a stage-3 offence. 
These are the High Court or the Cow1 of Appeal or the Supreme Com1 on appeal. 35 
Furthem1ore, it is required (and this is the crncial point of the three strikes law) that: 36 
(2) Despite any other enactment, if, on any occasion, an offender is convicted of 1 
or more stage-3 offences other than murder, the High Court must sentence the 
offender to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for each offence. 
The second consequence of the third sttike affects parole . Therefore the Act 
34 Sentencing Act 2002 ,s 86A(b ). 
35 Sentencing Act 2002 , s 86D(l). 
36 Sentencing Act 2002 , s 86D(2). 
12 
states ins 86D(3): 
.. . the couii must order that the offender serve the sentence without parole unless 
the court is satisfied that, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, it 
would be manifestly unjust to make the order. 
So the third strike has two consequences: firstly , it is mandatory that the comt sentences 
the offender to the maximum for the paiticular offence and, secondly, parole is not 
possible unless the comt is convinced that it would be manifestly unjust to deny it. The 
comt has no choice with regard to the sentence. It has to give the maximum for the 
offence. In case of manifest injustice it is only possible to give parole. But it is not 
possible to differ from the maximum sentence.37 This fact is quite important and the 
wording and the context of the Act is cleat·. The exception applies only to subsection (3); 
not to subsection (2) of s 86D of the Act. Again, in case of manifest injustice there is just 
a possibility of an exception to give parole but not any possibility to choose another 
sentence than the maximum. Because of that the statement of ACT that:
38 
The judge sentencing a Strike Three offender will have no option but to sentence 
the offender to the maximum sentence. The only exception is if the judge 
detem1ines it would be ' manifestly unjust' to do so 
is not co1Tect. 
It is not necessary that all three strikes consist of the same offence. It is rather possible to 
accumulate strikes for different offences . So it is possible that the first strike is given for 
a robbery, the second strike for a wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily haim 
and the third strike for kidnapping. 
In this example, the offender would receive a first warning for the robbery and would be 
sentenced to maybe two years in prison. For the wounding with intent to cause grievous 
bodily haim he or she would get the second st1ike and would be sentenced to maybe 3 
yeai·s in prison without pai·ole (because that would be a long-tenn sentence according to 
s 4 of the Parole Act 2002). The conviction for the kidnapping would be the third strike. 
The comt would sentence the offender to the maximum term of imprisonment for that 
37 WaITen Brook banks and Ri chard Ekins, above n 30, at 4 . 
38 Ibid . 
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offence, which is 15 years. Furthermore, the sentence would give the order that the 
offender is ineligible for parole.39 
But it is also possible that an offender commits several qualifying offences but still only 
receives one strike. The crucial aspect of a strike is if there is a warning in the previous 
court conviction.40 When there was no warning, an offence does not count as a strike. Of 
course, there is no choice to give a warning when a qualified offence is involved . But it 
might be possible that a serial offender is accused just once for several offences and gets 
just one strike for them. Multiple offences do not necessarily constitute multiple strikes. 
So it is possible that a serial offender is on his first or second strike and some "normal" 
offenders are already on their third strike although the serial offender had in fact 
committed more crimes than the "normal" offender.41 
A special regulation is made for manslaughter in s 86D( 4). The general rule applies : the 
maximum sentence, which is life imprisonment, has to be served without parol unless 
this would be manifestly unjust. But in addition to that, the minimum period of 
imprisonment has to be 20 years unless this would be manifestly unjust with regard to 
the circumstances of the offence and the offender. In such a case, the court must order a 
minimum period of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. Thus, the time of 
imprisonment for manslaughter is at least 10 years even in cases of manifestly injustice. 
(2) Murder 
As mentioned before, the new legislation makes a special regulation in cases of murder. 
The ordinary law prescribes that a murder must be punished by a life sentence unless 
this is manifestly unjust.42 Fmthe1more, the ordinary law presc ribes that if the cou1t 
imposes a life sentence, a minimum non-parole period of at least ten years must be 
imposed.43 But the ordinary law no longer applies after a first or a final waming .44 
Rather, the new s 86E of the Sentencing Act becomes relevant. The Act declares in s 
86E(l)(a) and (b) that the comt must: 
39 See another example in Warren Brookbanks and Richard Ekins, above n 30, at 4 . 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Sentencing Act 2002, s 102. 
43 Sentencing Act 2002, s I 03. 
44Waren Brook banks and Richard Ekins, above 30, at 4. 
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sentence the offender to imp1isonment for life for that murder; and order that the 
offender serve that sentence of imp1isonment for life without parole unless the 
court is satisfied that, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, it 
would be manifestly w1just to do so. 
If it is manifestly unjust, the Act provides under s 86E (4) that: 
(a) if that murder is a stage-3 offence, impose a minimum period of imprisonment 
of not less than 20 years w1less the court is satisfied that, given the circumstances 
of the offence and the offender, it would be manifestly unjust to do so; and 
(b) if that murder is a stage-2 offence, or if the court is satisfied that a minimum 
period of imprisonment of not less than 20 years under paragraph (a) would be 
manifestly unjust, order that the offender serve a minimum period of imprisonment 
in accordance with section I 03.
45 
The consequence of a murder in the three strike legislation is that life imprisonment is 
mandatory and that the sentence has to be served without parole unless this is manifestly 
unjust. If manifestly unjust the minimum period of imprisonment is 20 years unless this 
is again not manifestly unjust. 
Moreover s 103 Sentencing Act 2002 needs to be regarded in cases of stage 2 offences. 
It regulates the imposition of minimum period of imprisonment if life imprisonment is 
imposed for murder. It is stated that the court must in the case of life imprisonment order a 
minimum period of imprisonment not less then 10 years and that the court must consider the 
listed purposes in this section, such as protecting the community from the offender or 
holding the offender accountable. 
Thus, there are possibilities of an early release under parole and the possibility not to 
order the minimum time of imprisonment in cases of manifestly injustice. In the case of 
murder the difference of the three strikes law to the ordinary law is small because life 
imprisonment for murder is always the "nonnal" punishment. 
IV Development of the "Three Strikes Law" in New Zealand 
The three strikes law unde1went some dramatic changes on its way to become law. In 
some pa11s, these changes are highly relevant to the discussion whether the Act is 
compatible with the Bill of Rights and the principles of sentencing. However, a lot of the 
45 
Section 103 of the Sentencing Act 2002 regulates the imposition of minimum period of imprisonment if 
life imp1isonment imposed for murder. 
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problems with regard to the consistency with the Bill of Rights were solved during the 
development of the Act. But nevertheless it is worthwhile to take a close look at the 
development of the Act. This is necessary for the understanding of the intention of the 
Act and to get a whole picture of it. In that context, it is furthermore worthwhile to look 
at the parliamentary debates of the Bill to understand what the intentions of the 
supporters of the Bill are and which arguments were raised against it by its opponents. 
Because of that the development of the new legislation will be examined before 
discussing the consistency of the Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010 with the 
NZBORA and with the principles of Sentencing. 
A Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 ( 17-1) 
(I) Pwpose and goals of the Bill 
The first version of the three strikes law was introduced by the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill 2009 on 18 February 2009. In its explanatoiy are the objectives of the Bill 
as well as its issues laid down. 
The purpose of the Bill is " to create a three stage regime of increasing consequences for 
the worst repeat violent offenders" .46 The new legislation shall be:47 
specifically targeted at offenders who show contempt for the court system and the 
safety of others by continuing to offend despite long prison sentences and judicial 
wammgs. 
Fw1hermore, the new legislation shall: " improve public safety by incapacitating these 
offenders for longer periods". 48 
The explanatory note also deals with the present situation and why a change is 
necessruy. Therefore, it is stated that there is "a concern that serious and violent offenders 
go on to commit further serious and violent crimes" .49 This fact leads to a loss of confidence 
in the criminal system and that victims could not be sure when an offender will be released . 
46 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 ( 17- 1) ( explanatory note) at. I. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid . 
49 fbid , at 5. 
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For the same reasons, it 1s necessary to serve life imprisonment for the worst murders 
without parole.50 
As "risks and likely impacts" it is mentioned that serious violent offences are not always 
done by previous offender. So there would be no guarantee to prevent all violent 
offences. 51 
Another stated issue is a potential high impact of the new law on Maori and their loss of 
confidence in the criminal justice system. Moreover it is mentioned that the result of the 
most research shows that imprisonment has only little effect on deterrence
52 
and that the 
proposal may lead to disproportionate outcomes. 
But the explanatory note at the same time raises counterarguments and arguments to 
support the proposal.53 A longer sentence would increase the possibility ofrehabilitation 
and would have "compounding the effect on the whanau of offenders and the 
intergenerational effects on children separated from parents".
54 
(2) Parliamenta,y debate 
The Bill was discussed for the first tin1e in parliament at 18
th May 2009 . Different views 
about this new regulation where presented. National and ACT party supported the Bill, 
while Maori, Green, Progressive and Labour party opposed against it. 
The points of discussion were mainly the same like in the explanatory note. A frequently 
mentioned point on behalf of the opponents of the Bill was that other countries had tried the 
three strikes law and that it had not worked . Upcoming injustice and the high impact on 
Maori where further topics in the debate. 
Jim Anderton, leader of the Progressive party, mentioned that in all countries where the 
" three strikes" approach was used , the result out of it was "huge anomalies and greater 
injustice" .55 
50 Ibid . 
51 Ibid, at 9. 
52 Ibid, at 10 . 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid . 
55 (18 February 2009) 652 NZPD 1425. 
17 
~s 
IS 
1t 
te 
to 
Ill 
1e 
1/S 
11, 
:ly 
he 
on 
he 
ter 
17 
Meti1ia Turei of the Green party argued that the legislation would be "dangerous", 
"discriminatory" and will "fail to achieve a safer community".56 
The supporter of the three strikes law on the other hand found arguments to suppo1t their 
Bill. 
The discussion was controversies and raised some legal issues about discrimination and 
sentencing principles which will be discussed later on. 
Finally, the party vote on the question "that the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill be now 
read a first time" ended with the result of 64 Ayes and 58 Noes and the decision to refer 
the Bill to the Law and Order Committee. 57 
(3) Arrangements of the first Bill 
The first Bill required the Comt to sentence an offender to life imp1isonment following a 
third conviction for a serious violent offence. It was not just the maximum sentence of 
each offence, but rather life imprisonment regardless of the fulfilled offence. 
Another difference relates to the listed offences themselves. The first Bill listed 37 
offences that would constitute a "serious violent offence" in the sense of the Bill. In the 
process of the developing of the Act, other offences were added. 
B Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (17-2) 
Changes of significance were made in the Law and Order Committee. 
One and maybe the change from the highest impact was the change of s 86D. The first 
version of the Bill stated with regard to any third strike that the court is required to: 58 
(a) impose a sentence of imprisonment for life and 
(b) order that the offender serve a minimum period of imprisonment under that 
sentence. 
(3) The court must impose a minimum period of imprisonment of 25 years unless 
the court is satisfied that it would be manifestly unjust to do so. 
56 Ibid,at 1433 . 
57 Ibid, at 1440. 
58 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 ( 17-1 ), cl 860. 
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In comparison to that, the wording of this section after it passed the Committee was as 
follows: 
(2)Despite any other enactment, if, on any occasion, an offender is convicted of 1 
or more stage-3 offences other than murder, the High Court must sentence the 
offender to the maximum tenn of imprisonment prescribed for each offence. 
(3) When the Court sentences the offender under subsection (2), the Court must 
order that the offender serve the sentence without parole unless the Court is 
satisfied that, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, it would be 
manifestly unjust to make the order. 
As mentioned before, there are two big differences. The first is that the com1 is not 
required to sentence to life imprisonment; rather it is required to sentence the offender to 
the maximum penalty of each pmticular offence. The second difference can be seen in 
subsection (3 ). In the first version of the Bill, it was required that the court imposes a 
minimum period of imprisonment of 25 years while in the second version, the sentence 
needs to be served without parole. The exception for this requirement in both cases is 
manifest injustice. 
Furthe1more the special regulation of mm1mum imprisonment with regard to 
manslaughter ins 86D(4) and (5) was implemented. The committee had the view that it 
is necessm-y to "recognise the seriousness of taking a human life, while still 
distinguishing between murder and manslaughter"
59
. With this regulation the legislator 
shows how se1ious he takes the killing of a human. Even in cases of manifestly injustice 
of a life imprisonment a minimum period of imprisonment of at least 10 years is 
mandatory. 
Moreover, the Bill added a few more offences to list in s 86A. Pmticular sexual conduct 
with children and young people outside New Zealand; counselling or attempting to 
procure murder; conspiracy to murder; poisoning with intent to cause g1ievous bodily 
hmm; infecting with disease. The reason for adding these offences was that they are, in 
the view of the committee, serious violent offences.
60 As seen in the commentm-y of the 
Bill, the Committee thought about adding burglm·y and drug crimes to the list of the 
qualified offences, in pai1iculm· manufacture and sale of drugs. The reason for not 
adding burglai-y was that it is a prope1ty offence. Adding such a property offence would 
be inconsistent with the aim of the Bill to target the worst repeat violent and sexual 
59 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 ( 17-2) (Commentary), at 7 . 
60Ibid, at 4. 
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J 
offenders.61 The reason for not adding drugs to the list is that the aim of the Bill is not to 
deal with social problems caused by drugs.62 
In addition to that, the requirement of a written notice after a warning was added, too. 63 
This change is important, because it makes the consequences clearer for the offender. It 
is more fair and tries to ensure that the offender understands what will happen if he or 
she commits another crime. 
Furthermore, the Bill 17-2 makes changes with regard to the Court's jurisdiction. The 
changed s 86D(l) gave the High Court the exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving 
the second and third strike with regard to the trial. Furthermore, only the High Comt, the 
Comt of Appeal or the Supreme Court on appeal have jurisdiction over cases involving 
the third strike with regard to the sentencing.64 Reason for that change is that for most 
severe sanctions and the imposition of mandatory sentences, it is be appropriate that 
senior judges are responsible in such cases.65 This change is also a change for the good. 
The second and third strikes have drastic consequences to the offender. Because of that 
it is important that experienced senior judges decide about the case. 
The change in the stage-3 offence from shifting away from mandatory life imprisonment 
to mandatory maximum sentence makes it necessary to as well change the requirements 
for preventive detention.66 The reason for this is that the first Bill provided the 
possibility of a preventive detention sentence for a 1 and 2-stage offence but not for a 
stage-3 offence. This was not necessaiy because the life in1p1isonment with a minimum 
non-parole period of 25 years for every stage-3 offence would have almost inevitably 
been longer than a preventive detention sentence. Section 86D(7) of the Bill declares 
that the Court would be not precluded to order a sentence of preventive detention. But if 
the Court orders a preventive detention, it is necessaiy that this minimum period of 
imprisonment is not less than the maximum sentence of each offence. An exception for 
this requirement is made in the case that the Comt is satisfied that such a minimum 
period would be manifestly unjust. This change again shows that changes of the Bill 
brought a higher flexibility in the sentencing options. 
61 Ibid, at 5. 
62 Ibid. 
63Sentencing and Parole Reform Bi II 2009 ( 17-2), cl 86C( I )(2). 
64 Ibid, cl 86(l)(b). 
65 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (17-2) (Commentary) at 6. 
66 Ibid, at 8. 
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Another change was made with regard to the continuing effect of warnings in s 86F. In 
Bill (17-1 ), s 86F required the Court of Appeal to cancel a warning if it quashes the 
strike, meaning the conviction that resulted in the warning. Following a successful 
appeal, warnings would be disregarded. This regulation was not changed. In the 
commentary, the Committee makes clear that it is aware that presence of a warning 
could caITy a stigma for the offender, even when there would be no legal effect. Because 
of that it would be important to cancel such a warning. However, the Committee made 
some extensions in the case when a qualifying offence was replaced by another 
qualifying offence in an appeal. The view of the majo1ity of the Committee was that 
when a conviction was to be replaced with a conviction for another qualified offence the 
01iginal warning needs to relate to the subsequence conviction.
67 
As a consequence of the non-parole and minimum pe1iods if imprisonment regulation 
after a third or second strike changes with regard to the possibility of an appeal where 
made to balance the fairness.
68 
C Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (17-3) 
The Bill (17-3) does not make any big changes. Rather the changes attempt to clarify the 
wording in some sections. 
The parliamentary debate makes it clear one more time that the creators of the Bill see 
"parole as a p1ivilege and not as a right" which needs to be earned and that in their view 
offenders who were warned are not able to earn this p1ivilege anyrnore.
69 
The opponents of the Bill once more mentioned their arguments against it. They talked 
about the problem that judicial discretion will be shifted away from judges and in the 
hands of the police, that the Bill will bring injustice because the most listed offences can 
vary in their seriousness and that there would be an increase in cost and stress for 
victims because there would be less guilty pleas and more appeals.
7° Furthennore, it is 
mentioned that the regime will make the prisons a more dangerous place because 
offenders who are convicted for life have nothing to lose and offenders who have no 
67 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (17-2), cl 86D(4). 
68 Ibid, cl 86G. 
69 (25 May 2010) 663 NZPD 11 227 . 
70 Ibid, at 11 230 . 
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possibility of parole have no motivation to try their best m pnson to get an early 
release.71 
Once again, it becomes clear how controversial the discussion around the legislation is 
and that legal, practical and social problems are involved in the discussion around the 
three strikes law. 
Finally, Parliament voted with 63 to 58 that the Bill was read a third time.72 
V Inconsistency of the "Three Strikes Law" with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 
"Three-strike law may breach rights". 73 This was a headline of the NZ Herald on 
Monday, 2 March, 2009. Amnesty International also worried that the new provision is a 
breach of national and international human rights: 74 
The passing of the controversial "three strikes" bill yesterday is a serious blow to 
the fairness of New Zealand's criminal justice system as it removes the ability of 
judges to tailor sentences to the particular circumstances of an offence ... Amnesty 
International is concerned that provisions outlined in the Sentencing and Parole 
Refonn Bill are a direct breach of both domestic and international human rights 
laws. 
Furthe1more, the Attorney-General mentioned in his Interim Rep011 2009 that the 
proposal as firstly introduced was inconsistent with the NZBORA. 75 
All these statements were made with regard to the firstly introduced Bill (17-1 ), the 
version which provides life imprisonment for every third strike. The changes are 
changes for the better. But neve11heless, the NZBORA is still breached. 
71 Ibid, at 11237. 
72 Ibid, at 1124 7. 
73Patrick Gower "Three-strike law may breach rights" (New Zealand 2 March 2009) New Zealand Herald 
<www.nzhearald .co.nz>. 
74 Amnesty International "Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Bill 2009" . 
75 Christopher Finlayson "Interim Repo1i Attorney General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 on Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009". 
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A Breach of Section 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The new Act is a breach of s 9 of the NZBORA, the right not to be subjected to to1ture 
or cruel treatment. It states: 
Eve1yone has the right not to be subjected to to1ture or to cruel, 
degrading, or disprop01tionately severe treatment or punishment. 
1 Section 86D of the Sentencing Act 2002 
The new sections 86D fulfils the alternative of "disproportionately severe punishment" 
and thus breaches s 9 of the NZBORA. This section is regulating the third strike for 
offences other than murder. As seen above, it is mandatory to serve the maximum 
sentence of each offence on a third strike. There is no possibility for the Court to serve 
another sentence. That this is disproportional is the conclusion of an analysis of the 
applicable case law. 
The Supreme Cout1 of New Zealand dealt with the tenn "dispropo11ionately severe 
treatment or punishment" in the case Taunoa v Attorney-General.
76 This decision 
declared ptinciples of other juiisdictions applicable for the interpretation of s 9 of the 
NZBORA. The majo1ity held that:
77 
"disproportionately severe" ... has no counterpatt in the overseas instruments 
but must take its colour from the rest of s 9 and therefore from the jurisprudence 
under those overseas instruments .... the words "disproportionately severe" must 
have been included to fulfil much the same role as "inhuman" treatment or 
punishment plays in article 7 of the ICCPR 
78
, and to perfonn the same function as 
the gloss of "gross disproportionality" does for s 12 of the Canadian Charter
79
. 
Fut1he1more the majority found that a11icle 3 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR")
80 and the United 
States Constitution, pat1icularly the Eighth Amendment
81 add colour in the interpretation 
76 Taunoa v Altorney-General [2008] I NZLR 429 (SC). 
77 Ibid, at [172]. 
78 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed: 
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
pa11icular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation". 
79 "Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment." 
80 "No one shall be subjected to to1iure or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 
81 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted". 
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of section 9 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990.
82 "Add the colour in the interpretation" does 
not mean that the interpretation and understanding is the same, rather it just give some 
orientation. However, it is necessary to regard the listed jurisdictions and their 
interpretation of their corresponding regulations to come to an interpretation of s 9 of the 
NZBORA. 
The Supreme Com1 of Canada dealt with mandatory mrn1mum sentences and 
dispropo11ional punishment with regard to s 12 of the Canadian Chai1er the first time in 
R v Smith. 83 The background of the case was a mandatory seven-year minimum sentence 
for importing drugs. The sentence was finally struck down by the com1. 
The Court held that unusual punishment in s 12 of the Canadian Chai1er needs to be 
"grossly disproportionate to what would have been appropriate".84 Therefore, not every 
dispropo11ional sentence is in breach of s 12 of the Canadian Charter. Rather, it is 
necessaiy that it is grossly dispropo11ionate. To answer how to measure proportionality, 
the Cou11 gives some guidance:85 
The court in assessing whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate must consider 
the gravity of the offence, the personal characteristics of the offender, and the 
particular circumstances of the case to determine what range of sentences would 
have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate, deter or protect society from this 
particular offender. 
Therefore, it is important to regai·d the pai1icular circumstances, the particular offender 
and the case to find the proportional punishment. 
Fm1he1more, the Com1 developed the "hypothetical analysis". This is a theoretical 
compaiison of the present case with hypothetical cases. The Coui1 imagined the case of 
a young man returning from vacation with a single marihuana cigarette.86 It is held that a 
minimum sentence in this case would be an unusual punishment in accordance with the 
Canadian law. However, the hypothetical analysis was limited in R v Goltz 
87 to 
imaginable circumstances. This means that the Court has to "examine other reasonably 
82 (18May 2010)663NZPD 10895. 
83 R vSmith, [1987] I SCR 1045 . 
84 Ibid at [54]. 
85 Ibid, at [56]. 
86 [bid, at [79]. 
87 R v Goltz [1991] 3 SCR 485 . 
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imaginable circumstances m which the challenged law might violate s 12".
88 
"Imaginable circumstances" would mean circumstances "which could commonly arise 
in day-to-day life" .89 Background of that case was a charge and conviction of the 
offender to the mandatory minimum sentence of seven days imp1isonment, together with 
a fine of $300, because he had been driven with a suspended licence. The offender 
argued that the provision under which he was convicted
90 violate s 12 of the Canadian 
Charter.91 
In R v Morrise/2 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the analyses from Smith and 
added some additional factors which are relevant for the interpretation. The background 
of the case was the death of a friend of the offender after a gun accidentally discharged 
and wounded the victim. According to the criminal code of Canada, a mandatory four-
year sentence would be required for this offence. But the trial Judge found that this 
sentence violated s 12 of the Chatter and sentenced the offender to two years.
93 The 
Coutt of Appeal ove1tumed this ruling. The question for the Supreme Comt was, thus, if 
"a four-year minimum sentence of imp1isonment is an unusual punishment for the 
offence of criminal negligence causing death with a fireaim".
94 Finally, the Cou1t found 
that s 12 of the Canadian Chatter was not violated. In its analysis, the Coutt discussed 
other judgments which are dealing with the section in question of the criminal Code. It 
becomes cleat· that other accidents with firearms are included.
95 The Court fu1thermore 
analysed the sentence in his whole context. The gravity of the offence, the particular 
circumstances of the offender and the case
96
; the actual effect of the punishment on the 
offender97 and penological goals and sentencing principles
98 were regarded. After this 
detailed analysis, the Court held that four years imprisonment is not unusual punishment 
in this case. The Court made clear that such a detailed analysis is necessary to decide 
whether a punishment is unusual in the sense of s 12 of the Canadian Chatter.
99 
88 Ibid, at 26. 
89 Ibid, at 38. 
90 BC Motor Vehicle Act, s 88. 
91 R v Goltz, above, n 87, at 10. 
92 R v Morrissey [2000] 2 SCR 90. 
93 Ibid, at [59]. 
94 Ibid, at [I]. 
95 Ibid . 
96 Ibid, at [3 7]. 
97 Ibid, at [ 41]. 
98 Ibid , at [43]. 
99 Ibid, at [34]. 
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The latest decision of the Canadian Supreme Court regarding this matter is R v 
Latimer. 100 In this case, the offender murdered his disabled daughter because he thought 
that her life was not wo1th living. He claimed that the length of his prison sentence 
would be unusual punishment. The Court negates that. This decision refers back to the 
previous cases and includes again a detailed analyse of the case and with its different 
factors. 
Therefore it is important to regard and analyse the individual circumstances of the case 
to decide whether a punishment is "grossly disproportional" and thus unusual in the 
sense of s 12 of the Canadian Charter. 
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" in the Eight Amendment of the United 
States was incorporated into the American Constitution in 1791. 101 The first time that the 
Ame1ican Supreme court dealt with the principle that the punishment should fit the 
crime was in 1910 in Weems v United States. 102 Here, the Comt developed the principle 
of proportionality. 103 Other decisions followed. In the case of Rummel v Estelle 104, the 
Court had to deal with a life sentence with the possibility of parole for fraud crimes 
totalling $230. The statuto1y provisions in Texas, where the case happened, are 
equivalent to the three strikes scheme. 105 The Court laid down three objective criteria 
whether a length of criminal sentence is disproportional which were already announced 
in Weems. These are the nature of the offence, a comparison with sentences imposed in 
other jurisdictions for commission of the same crime and a comparison with sentences 
imposed in the same jurisdiction. 106 In Solem v Helm, 107 the Supreme Court had to deal 
with a case of mandatory life imprisonment without parole for the seventh non-violent 
conviction of the offender. In this decision, the Court refen-ed back to the test in Weems . 
Finally, the Court concluded that the sentence was unusual punishment. Especially the 
fact of non-parole has lead to this result. In Harmelin v Michigan
1011 the Court held that a 
mandatory life without parole sentence for the possession of more than 650 grams (in 
100 R vLatimer [2001] I SCR 3 . 
101 David Shichor and Dale K Sechrest Three Strikes and You 're out Vengeance as public Policy ( I st ed, 
SAGE Publications , Thousand Oaks, 1996) at 5 . . 
102 Ibid . 
103 Nom,an J Finkel Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Not ions of the Law (Harvard University Press Harvard , 
200 I). 
104 Rummel v Estelle, 445 US 263 ( 1980). 
105 David Sh ichor and Dale K Sechrest, above n IOI , at 295. 
106 Ibid, at 295. 
101 Solem v Helm , 463 US 277 (1983) . 
108 Harm elin vMichigan, 501 US 957 (1991). 
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the case 672 grams) of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment and thus not 
unconstitutional. This decision nanowed the propo1tionality docttine from 
"propo1tional" to "grossly disproportional". 
109 
The most impo1tant decision of the Supreme Court of the United States for the 
interpretation of the Eight Amendment with regard to the three strikes law is Ewing v 
California 110• In this case, the offender was sentenced to 25 years under California's 
three strikes provision for steeling three golf clubs wo1th $399 each from a pro shop. 
The offender was a recidivist with previous convictions for theft, burglary and robbe1y 
offences. A majo1ity of 5-4 held that the three sttikes law of California does not breach 
the Eighth Amendment. The majority found that just in extreme cases "grossly 
dispropo1tional" is fulfilled and can strike down a sentence. Fu1thermore, the majority 
found that it is enough that the state of California decided that a three strikes law can 
fulfil the goal of its c1iminal justice system. The three strikes law is a trend in c1iminal 
sentencing which targets career offenders. It is a policy decision whether repeat 
offenders will be punished more harshly or not. Furthermore, they stated that they did 
not sit as a "superlegislature to second-guess".
111 Thus the Supreme Comt adjudges the 
legislator a scope of assessment for how to deal with crime. However, the minority of 
the Cou1t found that judges need to be able detennine the length of a prison sentence. 
The reason for this is that the Comt has to prove the proportionality of fines, bails and 
death sentences but in cases of the three strikes law not the length of a prison sentence. 
In the view of the minority, there is no reason to make a difference between these 
sentences.
112 Furthermore, they expressed the view that the Eighth Amendment includes 
the obligation to take into account all goals of punishment to find a propo1tional 
. h ll3 ln h . . h 114 pun1s ment. t e1r view t e: 
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments expresses a 
broad and basic proportionality principle that takes into accow1t all of the 
justifications for pena I sanctions. 
The minority mentioned that it needs to be regarded that the offender did not commit a 
violent offence in the present case even when he is a recidivist. 
109 Ibid, at 15. 
11 0 Ewing v California [2003] 538 US 11. 
111 Ibid, at II B , per O'Connor J. 
11 2 Ibid, per Stevens J. 
11 3 Ibid . 
114 Ibid . 
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The commentary and court decisions on Article 3 of the ECHR include mainly the 
manner of the punishment (for example corporal punishment). The main focus is the 
protection from inhuman treatment of offenders and cruel.
115 Furthe1more, it is stated in 
a commentary that imprisonment is capable of breaching this article, especially when 
there is no possibility of early release from prison. 116 The ECHR mentioned that 
therefore a minimum of se1iousness of the disproportional between the offence and the 
punishment, i.e. the length of imprisonment is nesessary. 117 This application is close to 
the "grossly disproportional" approach of Canada and the United States. 
As seen, the test for unusual punishment in the United States and Canada is similar. Both 
adopted the test of "grossly disproportionate". In both interpretations, a comparison with 
other punishments is necessary. Neve1theless, the approach to regard the particular case 
with all its factors in Canada is a lot more pronounced than in the United States. In 
addition to that, the United States Supreme Comt dealt with three strikes provisions in 
compaiison to the Canadian Supreme Comt which only dealt with mandatory minimum 
sentences. In these decisions the majority of the United States Supreme Court found that 
the Californian three strikes legislation is not a disproportional punishment. And the 
California version of the three strikes law is much harsher than the one in New Zealand. 
It provides life imp1isonment for every third strike. However, it is not necessary to 
conclude that this interpretation is applicable to New Zealand. Rather, the interpretations 
just give colour to the interpretation of New Zealand's s 9 of the NZBORA. This colour 
delivers interpretation principles; not the interpretation itself Therefore, a punishment 
needs to be grossly dispropo1tionate regarding the individual factors of the case to 
breach s 9 of the NZBORA. Furthennore, there are strong arguments raised by the 
minority of the US Supreme Court who argued for a breach of the Eight Amendment. It 
is convincing that Judges have to prove proportionality closely and need to be able to 
prove and dete1mine the length of a p1ison sentence, which is not possible under the 
three strikes law. 
The Canadian Supreme Court did not deal with a three strikes provision, but rather with 
minimwn sentences in its decisions. In its view, it is important to regard the pa1ticular 
circumstances, the particulai· offender and the case to find the proportional punishment 
when to decide whether minimum mandato1y sentence is disproportional or not. In the 
11 5 Jens Meyer-Ladewig Kommentar ztir Europiiischen Menschenrechtskonvention (2nd ed , NOMOS , 
Baden- Baden 2006).at Rn 1 c. 
11 6 lbid . 
11 7 ECHR 18 Ja11ual'y 1978, NJW 1979. 
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mentioned decisions some mandatory minimum sentences were found to be grossly 
disproportionate. 
In the judgement of R v Goeltz is stated: 
11 8 
Many of the mandatory sentences ... may not be cruel and unusual. But if, to 
boITow the language of Lamer J. in Smith, it is "inevitable that, in some cases, a 
verdict of guilty will lead to the imposition of a tem1 which will be grossly 
disprop01iionate" (p . 1078), the entire subsection must be struck down. 
Thus a simple mandatory minimum sentence can violate the Canadian Charier. In case 
of a mandatory minimum sentence the Court has still a scale (as long as the minimum is 
not life imprisonment) to play with. In comparison to that a third strike in 86D 
Sentencing Act 2002 leaves no room to deal with the length of the prison sentence at all. 
It is impossible to regard the particular· circumstances of the case. Because of that it 
need to be concluded that when a provision which leaves room to deal with the 
particular circumstances of the case can breach the right against unusual punishment, a 
provision without such a room can breaches the right too. Even regarding that two 
previous convictions ar·e preceding the third strike, the result is the same. This fact is 
used as a justification for the third strike. But this is not the question. Still: it is even 
more impossible to regard the circumstances of each case on a third strike than in a 
mandatory minimum sentence. And such a situation can lead to injustice and thus the 
violation of s 9 NZBORA. 
One example for an injustice outcome of the three strikes law was mentioned by Clayton 
Cosgrove in the parliament debate on 18 May 2010. 
11 9 He refeITed to a case of 
manslaughter. 120 He ar·gued that it would be unjust that an offender with two former 
strikes 40 years ago would receive the maximum sentence (which is life 
imprisonment
12 1
) for a tragic hunting accident. And indeed , such an outcome is 
dispropo1tional. As seen above, the special regulation for manslaughter in s 86D (4) 
prescribe that even in cases of manifestly injustice a minimum imprisonment of at least 
10 years is mandatory. 10 Years for a tragic hunting accident seemed to be way to long. 
This result can be proved by Morrisey. As mentioned above, the trial judge saw even 4 
years of a mandatory sentence as to long. The Supreme Court saw 4 years of 
118 R v Goltz, above n 87 , at [53]. 
11 9 (18 May 2010) 663 NZPD, at 10913 . 
120 Ibid. 
12 1 Crimes Act 1968, s 177 . 
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imprisonment as propo11ional, but just because of a comparision with other hunting 
accidents which got the same punishment. But between 4 and 10 years is a big 
difference. No hunting accident outside of the three strikes law will be punished with 10 
years of imprisonment. Such a long time can not be seen as proportional anymore. 
Moreover it is not sure in under the New Zealand three strikes law that the time of 
imprisonment will be 10 years. Rather a new decision about an early release on parole 
by the parole board is necessary. It is easily possible that a person who lived the last 40 
years in accordance with the law will go for a long time into prison because of a hunting 
accident. 
Similar examples can be found for other offences. Especially the fact that there is now 
time limit for the previous strikes can lead to such unjust outcomes. 
Of course, it is not a question that the sentence for an offender after several offences can 
be and may need to be tougher. This is a normal sentencing practice and a common 
aggravating factor. Furthermore, not every case will be disproportional under the new 
legislation. There will be cases in which the sentence fits the c1ime. However, the 
example above shows that there is a high potential of dispropo11ionality. In the most 
cases, the maximum penalty will not fit the crime. It is rare that the maximum penalty 
needs to be given. Most of the times, there are mitigating factors which need to be 
regarded. Furthermore, it is rare that cases reach the highest scale of the offence. To 
prevent disproportionality, it would be necessary to give an exception in the third strike 
with regard to the length of the sentence itself and not just to the parole. 
Also the fact that parole might be possible in cases of manifest injustice does not change 
the result. In fact , parole might lead to an early release and a shotter time in prison so 
that the maximum sentence will be not served . However, there are differences between 
to give a possibility of parole or to give a possibility to differ from the mandatory 
maximum sentence itself. The practical difference is the way of the decision. Parole just 
applies for long term sentences. 122 In cases of long te1m sentences the parole board has 
to decide whether the offender get parole or not. This process includes different steps 
with hearings and the analysis of the case. And after all , it is not clear if the offender will 
get parole . Beside that an early release under parole usually includes conditions of 
release. 123 So it is not clear whether the offender will be released early and if he will be 
122 Parole Act 2002 , s 6(4) . 
123 Parole Act 2002 , s 109. 
released, he will have to fulfil the conditions. This does not happen when the sentence is 
from the beginning less than the maximum penalty. Notwithstanding practical 
differences, a different message will be served to offenders and, in general, if a law 
provides the possibility of regarding individual circumstances or just gives the 
possibility of a release on parole as an exception. Again: in order to give the possibility 
to regard the particular circumstances, it would rather be necessary to give an exception 
to the mandato1y maximum sentence itself. It would be necessaiy to give the comt the 
possibility to differ from the maximum in cases of manifest injustice. 
Regai·ding the development of the Bill the result is still the same: s 9 of the NZBORA is 
violated. The change in the legislation reduces the chance of dispropo1tion results 
because the maximum sentence is more individual for each case than a mandato1y life 
imprisonment for eve1y qualified offence. This provision at least regards what kind of 
offence was committed. However, as already mentioned the provision does still not 
regai·d the facts of the case and includes the high risk of dispropo1tional results. 
To summarise the analysis of the different jmisprndences: s 9 of the NZBORA 1s 
violated because after a detailed case analysis in the most of the cases the maximum 
penalty for the offence will be dispropo1tional. 
The rights in the ZBORA are generally limited by s 5 NZBORA. However, the 1ight to 
be free from torture is an absolute right and its breach can never be justified under s 5 
NZBORA. 
124 But this does not apply to dispropo1tional punishment. If such a 
punishment violates s 9 of the NZBORA, a justification under s 5 NZBORA is 
possible. 1
25 Because of that an analysis whether the breach can be justified under s 5 
NZBORA or not becomes necessaiy. 
Section 5 of the NZBORA states: 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this 
Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
This means that if a right is breached it is necessai·y to examine whether this breach can 
be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". It is necessa1y to consider 
124 Brookers "Commentary Human Rights Law" Brookers on line, <www.brookersonline.co.nz> . 
125 Andrew Buttler and Petra Buttler Th e New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commenta,y (Lex is Nex is, 
Wellington, 2005), at 242. 
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factors like the objectives of the proposal, the interest addressed in the breached right or 
the extent to which the proposal breaches the right126• 
In general there are two possible approaches how a right can be limited. These are 
"definitional balancing", which na1rnws the scope of the rights, and "ad hoe balancing", 
which consider limitations or restrictions under on a case by case basis. 127 In the early 
days of NZBORA jurisprudence, the courts favoured the first approach, now they 
mainly use the second one. 128 
However, the test whether limitations on rights are "demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society" is one of propoitionality. 129 
The leading case in New Zealand for the interpretation of the methodological s 5 of the 
NZBORA is R v Hansen. 130 
The test whether a breach is demonstrably justified is highly influenced by the Canadian 
Jurisprudence and the leading decision R v Oakes 131 The Comt refers paiticularly to the 
Canadian case law. 132 
In R v Oakes, the Canadian Supreme Court established a five step test to identify 
whether a limit on a tight is "demonstrably justified" under s 1 of the Canadian Charter, 
which is similar to s 5 of the NZBORA. 
In the first step, it has to be exan1ined if the objective of the limiting provision is so 
important that the ovelTiding of the particular right can be warranted. 133 The second step 
is to detennine whether the objective is reasonable. 134 This second step again includes 
three different steps. The first question is if there is a rational connection between the 
provision and the purpose of the limitation. Secondly, it is necessary that the provision 
affects the right as little as possible. The question is if there are alternative ways which 
126 Ministry of Justice The Handbook of the NZBORA (Wellington 2004). 
127 Andrew Buttler and Petra Buttler, above n 125, at 120. 
128 Brookers "Commentary- Human Rights Law", above, n 124, at 5.02. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1. 
131 R v Oakes [1986] I SCR 103 (SC). 
132 See, eg, Blanchard J Hansen, above n 130,at [I 03],[ 104], [120]; Elias CJ Hansen, above n 130, 
[64],[65]. 
133 Hansen , above n 130, at [121]. 
134 Ibid . 
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still achieve the provision's objective. The third and last step is a final analysis of 
proportionality. 135 The more serious the breach of the right is, the more important the 
objective of the breach must be in order to justify it.
136 
In the first step, it needs to be regarded that the objectives stated by the parliament need 
to be seen as sufficiently impo1tant most of the time.
137 It is rare that the goals of the 
parliament are without legitimacy. 138 
The objective of the three strikes law is, as was mentioned before, to "deny parole to 
repeat offenders" and to "impose maximum terms of imprisonment" on them.
139 Its aim 
is to bring the "worst of the worst" offenders into prison. The goal is to protect the 
public and to deter other potential offenders and the offender himself. The protection of 
the public and concepts of prevention in criminal justice can generally be seen as 
impo1tant enough to wan-ant a limitation to oveITide a right or freedom because this 
purpose is impo1tant for society and the coexistence of the people. A mandato1y 
minimum sentence can be justified because of general deten-ence or the seriousness of 
the type of the offending. 140 It is possible to reach the goals of the provision. To put 
violent offenders in prison seems to be a possibility to protect the public from them. 
Furthermore, it seemed to be possible to deter offenders or potential offenders with 
h h · h 141 ars pums ments. . 
However, the new provisions are not able to stand the test on the second step. Here the 
parliament has to choose the option which limits the 1ight as little as reasonably 
possible. 142 With regard to the three strikes law, there are less intrnsive possibilities to 
reach its purpose. It is not necessary to introduce a three strikes law to achieve harsher 
punishments. The instrnments of the Sentencing Act 2002 are enough. It is possible to 
give a maximum sentence if the judge thinks this is reasonable in the pa1ticular case. 
Furthe1more, s 8 of the Sentencing Act 2002 already provides a regulation which 
declares that the maximum must be served whenever it is suitable. It is a provision for 
judges to order the maximum when a case crosses the boarder and reaches the highest 
135 Ibid. 
136 Brookers "Commentary- Human Rights Law", above n 124 . 
137 Ibid. 
138 Hansen , above n 130 ,at [207]. 
139 Sentencing Act 2002 , s 3. 
140 Andrew Buttler and Petra Buttler, above n l 25 , at 238. 
141 If the three strike law is able to deter will discussed later. 
142 Hansen, above n 130, at [1 l 3]-[119). 
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level of the offence. So there are alternatives in the existing law to reach the purpose 
without unjust results and while regarding the particular case. If the legislation would 
like to "target[ ... ] offenders who show comptempt for the court system and the safety of 
others of continuing the offend" 143 and to "improve public safety by incapacitating these 
offenders for longer pe1iods" 144 they could reach this purpose with guidelines and 
policies of sentencing. They could give orientation and rnles how to sentence. With this 
it is possible to declare goals in sentencing but guarantee at the same time that an 
individual sentence is possible. 
Furthe1more, the provision cannot stand the last step of the test, the proportionality 
inquiry. It is the will of the legislature that violent and sex offences are worse than others 
and that offenders who commit such crimes for a third time are not w011h to get another 
chance. The legislator has scope for assessment how to deal with crime and how to 
punish. 
145 This was also an argument used by majo1ity of the United States Supreme 
Com1 in Ewig. But it is not free in that assessment. Rather rights of freedom like s 9 of 
the NZBORA limiting such an assessment. This is the function of such rights. Because 
of that, the fact of potential unjust outcomes weight heavier than the scope for 
assessment of the legislator. 
The danger of an unjust punishment is too high. As mentioned above, such unjust 
punishment is possible in several cases. In the most cases the maximum penalty does not 
fit the case. There are still too many opportunities how to commit a crime and to many 
factors which can play a role in order that such a mechanic sentencing could be 
propo11ional. This cannot be justified by the purpose of the Act. 
Section 9 of the NZBORA is violated bys 86D and this breach cannot be justified under 
s 5 of the NZBORA. 
2 Section 86E Sentencing Act 2010 
Another result brings the analysis of s 86E which regulates the second and third stiike 
for murder. It does not breach the ZBORA. Life imp1isonment for murder is not 
grossly dispropo11ional. Rather a comparison with other ju1isdictions and real or 
hypothetical cases and punishments (like developed by the Ame1ican and Canadian 
143 Sentencing and Parole Refo1m Bill ( 17-1) (explana1ory note), at l. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Hansen, above n 130,at [207] and [105]. 
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Cowts to measure proportionality) leads to this result. Life imp1isonment is also 
mandatory in the ordinary law. 146 Every murder will be punished to life imprisonment; 
this is a common penalty in a lot of jurisdictions. 
147
• Moreover it needs to be regarded 
that murder is the worst of all offences. That life protection is one of the highest goods 
and offences against it are highly unaccepted can be seen for example in the life 
protection in the Bill of Rights and similar documents all over the world. Additionally 
s 86E parole is possible when given circumstances of the offence and the offender would 
lead to a manifestly unjust result. This is in the case of murder proportional , especially in 
compaiison to manslaughter. Manslaughter can be a tragic hunting accident while 
murder is a willing act of killing a person. This is a difference. And to punish taking a 
life with this attitude is not dispropo1tional. 
In summa1y: Murder is the worst offence. Every murder will be sentenced to life 
imprisonment, constantly under the three strikes or the ordinaiy law, in New Zealand 
and in a lot of other countries. Finally parole is also possible under the three strikes 
provision and can prevent unjust outcomes. 
3 Conclusion 
Section 86D violates s 9 of the NZBORA because it does not stand the propo1tionality 
test and does not leave room to regard the paiticular circumstances of the case. 
Section 86D on the contrary does not breach s 9 of the NZBORA. Life imprisonment for 
murder is proportional and it is still possible to regard the circumstances of the case 
because of the possibility of parole in cases of injustice. 
B Discriminatory Impact of the Three Strikes Law 
Many people worry about a discriminato1y impact of the three stiikes law on Mao1i. 
Tatiana Turia, the Co-Leader of the Maori Pa,ty, for example, refen-ed to research from 
the United States which indicates a higher impact of the three strikes law on African 
Americans than white Americans . 148 She expressed the fear that the same will happen in 
New Zealand with regard to Maori . 
146 Crimes Act 196 1, s 172. 
147 So for ex ample as well in Gem1an y in ~2 11 S tGB . 
148 (1 8 February2009) 652 NZPD 1432. 
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Hone Harawira, member of the Maori Patty, talked about p1ison statistics where 50 per 
cent of the inmates were Maori although they represent just 14 per cent of the population 
of New Zealand.
149 
He argued that the three strikes regime will not change anything, 
because the offenders will not learn anything out of the first and second strike because 
they just react to problems the only way they know of Furthermore, he mentioned the 
fact that Maori are more likely to be convicted, sentenced to jail and be given longer 
sentences_ ,so 
And indeed, the 2007 sentencing and conviction statistics shows that 5680 Miio1i were 
convicted and sentenced for violent offences, as compared with 4 630 Pakeha. This 
number needs to be seen with regard to the population basis. 'st Bearing that in mind, the 
representation of Maori is three times higher than the representation of Piikeha in this 
category of offences. 
This c1itique was not just raised in New Zealand. Rather, it exists in all countries which 
adopted a three strikes law. A higher impact to black Americans 1s2 in the United States 
and to Aborigines in Australia is mentioned. 1s3 
That a three st1ikes regime, namely the regime of the Northern Territory of Australia, 
might be able to have a disc1iminatory impact on indigenous people was found by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Disc1imination (CERD) of the UN. The 
Committee proclaimed that the three strikes law would have a discriminato1y impact on 
the Aboriginal people. It stated: 154 
The mandatory sentencing schemes appear to target offences that are committed 
disproportionately by indigenous Australians, especially in the case of juveniles, 
leading to a racially discriminatory impact on their rate of incarceration. The 
Committee seriously questions the compatibility of these laws with the State party's 
obligations under the Convention and recommends the State pa11y to review all 
laws and practices in this field. 
149 (25 May 2010) 639 NZPD 11238. 
150 Ibid, at 11238 . 
151 Ibid. 
152 Neil Morgan, above n 2. 
153 Luke Neal and Mirko Bagaric "After Three St1ikes- The Continued Discriminatory Impact of 
Sentencing System Against Indigenous Australians: Suggested Reform" (2002) 26 Criminal Law Journal 
279. 
154 "Concluding observation by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ; Australia" 
CERD/C/56/Misc.42/rev.3 (2000), at [J 6], <www.faira.org.au>. 
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One explanation for a discriminatory impact of the three strike
s law is that it involves a 
selection of offences. 
155 It pays attention to special activities which are incorporated in
 
the list of qualified offences. One example comes from the U
nited States. There, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that a transaction involvi
ng five gran1s of 'crack' 
cocaine can attract the san1e mandato1y penalty as 500 gr
ams of powder cocaine. 
Interesting thereby is that crack is the drug of the poor black A
mericans , while powder 
cocaine is the drug of choice in an "upper class" of the society. 
156 But this is not the case 
in New Zealand. Drug offences are not included in the Act an
d also the other offences 
are not "typical" for Maori. Rather there are violent and sex offe
nces. 
However, a close look to the meaning of "discrimination" is 
necessary to answer the 
question whether the three strikes law will have a discriminat01
y impact on Maori or not. 
The ZBORA provides protection against discrimination ins 19: 
Freedom from discrimination 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of 
discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993. 
(2) Measures taken in good faith for the purpose of assisting or advanc
ing persons 
or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination that 
is unlawful by 
virtue of Part 2 of the Human Rights Act 1993 do not constitute discr
imination. 
What forbidden grounds of discrimination are, is then provided
 for ins 21 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993 (HRA). These are sex, marital status, religious beli
ef, ethical belief, 
colour, race, ethnic or national origins, disability age, politi
cal options, employment 
status, family status and sexual 01ientation. 
New Zealand has until now no definitive judgment on what con
stitutes discrimination.
157 
However, s 19 might be infringement if there is a
158 
(1) different treatment (2) between the complainant and someone 
in comparable 
circumstances (3) "on the ground" of one of the prohibited
 grounds of 
discrimination listed in s 21 HRA; (4) that disadvantages the compla
inant; and (5) 
Cannot be justified under s 5 NZBoRA. 
155 Neil Morgan, above n 2. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Brookers Comm enta,y on Human Rights, above n 124 . 
158 Ibid . 
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Regarding this test already the first requirement needs to be negated. There is no 
different treatment between Maori and pakeha. The three strikes law applies to all in the 
same way. Eve1y single offender who commits two previous qualified offences will get 
a third strike. This is not discrimination because of race or ethical origin. The fact that 
Mao1i are more likely to be convicted and more in the focus of the prosecution 
authorities is a social problem but not a question of disc1imination. The new legislation 
itself treats all offenders equally. 
But the protection from discrimination m s 19 NZBORA 1s not limited to direct 
discrimination, rather it includes indirect discrimination. 159 Indirect discrimination 
means that a neutral law, rule or practice has in fact a disproportional impact to a 
specific group. 160 There is conciseness that the impact of the three strikes law on Maori 
will be higher. So, in fact, the neutral Act will have a disproportional impact on one 
group, the Maori. 
However, an indirect discrimination does not automatically violate the NZBORA. 
Rather, such discrimination can be justified bys 5. 161 What is "demonstrably justified" 
needs to be examined again with the test out of R v Hansen. 
As already mentioned, the objective of the limiting provision, the three strikes law, is to 
impose a maximum imprisonment and deny parole for repeat offenders. Protection of the 
public and deteITence are the aims of the legislation. These aims and purposes are 
important reason to oveITide the protection from disc1imination. Therefore, the first step 
of the test is passed. 
Fmthem1ore, the provision passes the second step of the test. The objective of the three 
strikes law is reasonable with regard to discrimination. The three strikes law gives a 
relevant basis for the distinction. Justifications for the Act, and especially the third st1ike 
with its mandatory sentence, are the previous offences. Previous offences are a generally 
known aggravating factor. It is appropriate to punish repeat offenders harsher than 
others. The question is just if there is a justification for an unequal treatment and not if 
the treatment itself is dispropoitional. The question if the treatment itself is 
159 North ern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commiss ion [1998] 2 NZLR 218 at 236 and 238 . 
160 Andrew Buttler and Petra Buttler, above n 125, at 502 . 
161 Selene Mize " Indirect Discrimination Reconsidered" (2007) I NZLRev 27, at 58. 
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disproportional is a question of s 9 not of s 19 NZBORA .. The protection from indirect 
discrimination aims to avoid reasonableness unequal treatment, not to protect from 
disproportional punishment itself But such an unreasonableness treatment is not given. 
Rather, as mentioned before, the previous offences can justify the unequal outcome. 
That one group is more affected than another while committing more crimes is a normal 
outcome of criminal justice provisions. As mentioned before, Maori are generally more 
effected by the Crimes Act because they are committing more crimes. But this fact leads 
not to an indirect discrimination of the Crimes Act itself Moreover the situation in New 
Zealand is different than in the mentioned cases of the United States and Australia. The 
three strikes law applies to all violent and sex offence. It is not like in the mentioned 
example from the United States that one drug offend committed by black Americans is 
included meanwhile a drug offence committed by mainly white Americans is not 
included. Rather there is no differentiation between the offences. 
The protection of the public and its interest in punishing violent and sex offenders, thus 
really se1ious offences, weight higher than the interest of the Maori not to be subject of 
indirect discrimination. Because of that proportionality is given. It is propo11ional to 
punish a group of offenders who are more likely to committee crimes than other ethnical 
groups. This is in the interest of the public. 
The indirect discrimination is justified under s 5 of the NZBORA. 
The three strikes law is not discriminatory and does not violate the NZBORA. 
C Breach of Other Rights 
Other rights of the NZBORA are not violated by the three strikes law. 
There are two rights there are wo11hwhile to briefly look at: s 23(5) and s 26(2) of the 
NZBORA. 
Section 23(5) of the NZBORA requires that: 
Everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the person. 
39 
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This section has its counterpart in article 10 ICCPR.
162 Ifs 23 (5) is applicable s 9 might 
be too because there is some overlap.
163 However, s 23(5) is not breached by the new 
regulation. Section 23(5) applies in cases were the person is already in prison, a police 
cell or a similar institution.
164 It deals with the treatment of the prisoners. This is not the 
area of the three strikes law. It just deals with the sentencing but not what happens to the 
offender in prison. The fact that the offender may unjustly be in prison is not enough to 
breach s 23(5). 
Section 23(5) deals with the prohibition of double jeopardy: 
No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence 
shall be tried or punished for it again. 
The three strikes law leads to a continuing effect of the previous offence in the second 
and third strike. However, this seems to be not enough to see this as another punishment 
for the same offence. Furthennore every previous offence gives effect to the sentence. It 
is a basic rule of sentencing that a previous offence may be an aggravating factor. 
Section 26(2) is not violated. 
(4) Conclusion 
Section 86D of the New Act violates the NZBORA. It is a breach of s 9 because it 
disregards the circumstances of the paiticular case. However, the new Act does not 
breach s 23(5) and neither the prohibition of double jeopardy. Fuithermore, the 
discriminato1y impact on Maori can be justified under s 5. 
VI Reconcilability with Rules of Sentencing 
Sentencing underlies some basic principles. They can be found in s 7 of the Sentencing 
Act 2002, which describes the purpose of sentencing in New Zealand . These principles 
are dete1Tence, incapacitation, just dese11s , retribution, rehabilitation and restitution . 
These basic principles are mostly incompatible with the three strikes law. Just the 
principle of incapacitation can justify the legislation . 
162 Amnesty International , above n 74 . 
161 Taunoa v Attorney-General, above n 7 6, at [79-80 ]. 
1~he Mini try of Justice Th e Handbook of th e NZBORA (Wellington, 2004) , at Pait III Section 23 . 
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A Deterrence 
DeteJTence as a purpose of sentencing is stated in s 7(f) of the Sentencing Act 2002 and 
is used in a large number of cases to justify the sentence selected.
165 DeteITence is the 
attempt to restrain persons from offending by the threat ofpunishment.
166 
Dete1Tence can be divided into two categories: specific deteJTence and general 
deteJTence. General deteJTence focuses on general prevention of crime by making 
examples of specific deviants.
167 It will deter other persons who think about offending in 
the same way as a punished offender.
168 Specific deteITence is focused on the individual 
offender. It will deter the offender from re-offending.
169 
Whether the three sttikes law has a deteITing effect or not was a big point of discussion 
in all of the parliamentary debates about the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill. The 
supporters of the Bill were sure about it that it would. David GaJTet from the ACT party 
mentioned for example in the debate of the 15
th May 2010: 
Criminals know about this legislation now .. , criminals are not stupid. They may not 
have university degrees or even have finished high school, but they know about 
cause and effect as it affects them. All the criminals will know in 5, 6, or 7 years, 
when the first third-striker goes away for 14 years if their conviction was for 
aggravated robbery, or 20 years if it was for sexual violation. The criminals will 
know about it, just as they know today when a child sex offender has been 
convicted and which prison that offender will tum up in. They know. They are not 
stupid. 
On the other hand, the opponents of the Bill doubted any deteITence effect. They mainly 
refer to research results from the United States. Additonaly the explanatory note also 
mentioned that research has shown that the three strikes law just has a little deteITence 
effect. 170 
On the first sight the three strikes law seem to deter in both ways, individually and in 
general. The warning in the first and second strike associated with the indication of the 
consequences of re-offending can deter offenders. The fact of a harsh punishment in the 
165 
Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law Brookers Online <www.brookersonline.co .nz>. 
166 Geoff Hall Sentencing La\V and Practice (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2004). 
167 
Andrew Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4
th edition, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005) at 75 . 
168 Geoff Hall , above n 166, at 51 . 
169 Ibid . 
170 Sentencing and Parole Refo1111 Bill 2009 (17-1) (explanatory Note), at 10. 
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third strike might also be able to deter in general. And also the arguments of David 
Gan-et seemed to be plausible and underline the deten-ence effect of the three strikes law. 
Potential offenders are aware of the three strikes law. 
However, at second sight the deterrence effect of the three strikes legislation is not that 
clear anymore. 
One problem of deterring potential offenders with harsher punishments is that the fear of 
a potential sentence is only an issue when the potential offender believes that there 
might be the chance to get caught. 171 Many studies have shown that the deten-ence effect 
is much higher after changes in levels of enforcement and prosecution rather than in the 
sentencing practice.172 Deten-ence depends on the determination of the offender if it is 
wo1thwhile to commit the crime. 173 It is a balancing of the costs and the benefits. The 
life circumstances and what the individual offender has to lose from being caught 
become important. 
Another point of importance whether sentencing can deter or not is how well-known the 
consequences of a crime are. This is influenced by facts like media interest and 
communication. This problem might be relatively small with regard to the three st1ikes 
law in New Zealand because of two reasons. The first reason is that the introduction of 
the three strikes law got a high media interest. The second reason is provided by the Act 
itself: the offender of a stage-I offence must to get a written notice which warns him 
about the consequences of fmther crimes. 174 
However, another problem of deterrence is that some c1imes are committed on 
impulse. 175 Offenders take chances rather than planning the offence in advance.
176 This 
leads to another point. The effect of dete1Tence depends on the c1ime. Violent offences 
like the qualified offences in the Act are mainly not planed. Rather, they are committed 
out of a situation. Because of that, this factor influences the deterrence success of the 
three strikes law. Fmthermore, individual experience or experience of friends with 
offending may influence the dete1Tence effect. 
l7lMinistry of Justi ce Sentencing Policy and Guidance A Discussion Paper (We llington 1997), at 46 . 
172 Ibid, at 48. 
173 Andrew Ashworth , above n 167, at 75 . 
174 Sentencing Act 2002 , s86B(l )(a). 
175 Bruce Robe11son, above n 165 . 
176 Andrew Ahworth, above n 167, at 76. 
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All this shows that deten-ence is influenced by a lot of factors. To deter potential 
offenders from offending or re-offending is much more complicated than just deliver 
harsher punishments or establish a regime like the three st1ikes law. Moreover there are 
still the research results which say that harsher punishment instead of the probability of 
detection has an impact on deten-ence. 
This result can be proved by a look at the expenence with the three strikes law in 
California. The crime statistic shows a declining crime rate since the introduction of the 
three strikes regime.
177 But whenever crime rates are analysed, it needs to be kept in 
mind that such statistics are highly influenced by the behaviour of prosecution 
authorities, their equipment and personnel situation.
178 Another point that needs to be 
regarded are the undetected cases. 
179 Many crimes are not accounted for in the statistics 
at all. 180 Because of that, the c1ime rate in California needs to be analysed carefully. On 
the first view, the c1ime rate declined after the introduction of the three strikes law. It 
fell by 43 percent statewide between 1994 and 1999 (the three strikes regime was 
introduced in 1994 ). However, the rate had already declined by 10 per cent between 
1991 and 1994. Furthermore, it rose again after 1999.
181 In addition to that, other reasons 
for the declining can be identified. These are in pai1icular a strong economy, 
demographic changes, more effective law enforcement and a decline in handgun use. 
182 
All this shows that the analyses of crime rates is much more complicated than just 
thinking that the introduction of a new legislation is the only reason for the declining of 
a c1ime rate. It might be one reason but never the pure and only one. 
There might be some potential for a dete1Tence effect in the three strikes regime. But 
there are to many other factors, which play an impo11ant role with regard to the question 
of deteJTence. As mentioned above, the research results ai·e that harsher punishment has 
no deten-ence effect. Rather other factors like the chance to get caught are relevant for 
the success of deteITence. Because of that the three sttikes law alone might not be able to 
deter offenders. Rather it would deter offenders of the qualified offences in a higher 
grade when they would know that the chance to get caught is high. 
177US Department of Justice "Criminal Victimization 2000: Changes 1999-2000 with Trends 1993-2000" 
(2001) < www .ojp.usdoj.gov>. 
178Hans Goppinger Krimino!ogie (CH Beck, Munich 2008) at 357 . 
179 [bid, at 348 and 351. 
180 Bernd Dieter Meier Krimino!ogie (CH Beck, Munchen 2010) at 139. 
181 
Brian Brown and Greg Jolivette ,,A Primer: Three Strikes - The Impact After More Than a Decade" 
(2005) Legislativ Analyst Office <www.lao.ca.gov>. 
182 Ibid. 
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B Incapacitation 
Incapacitation aims to "protect the community from the offender".
183
• Today this goal is 
mainly achieved through prison sentences. Death penalties or banishment serve the same 
purpose. And also the three strikes law is a classic example of incapacitation.
184 
Incapacipation has some parallels to deten-ence. Both principles aim to protecting future 
• · 185 v1ct1ms. 
That incapacitation and with it the protection of the public is one of New Zealand's 
sentencing goals was confiimed by the Court of Appeal in R v Ward.
186 The Court says 
that the protection of the public is a legitimate factor in sentencing but nevertheless any 
reason of incapacitation should not take the sentence beyond what is propo11ionate to the 
offence. 
The main point of c1itique on incapacitation as sentencing purpose is that the offender is 
punished for something that it is believed he might do in the future and not for what he 
has done in the past. 187 
However, as mentioned before, the three st1ikes law is a classic example for 
incapacitation 188 and can be justified with this purpose of sentencing. 
C Just Desert 
Just Desert means "to hold the offender accountable for ha1m done to the victim and the 
community by the offending". 189 It will punish the offender for a wrongdoing. 
190 
Background of this theory is that as long as every member of the society accepts the law, 
everyone at the same time receives the benefit from a law-abiding society. 
191 
Punishment is seen as a tool to reinforce the society's inhibitions against offending by 
reaffoming with the mles of the society and the law itself Because of that the process of 
sentencing may vary from one society to another and the understanding what is 
183 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(g). 
184 Andrew Ashworth , above at 167, at 81. 
185 Ibid. 
186 R v Ward [1976] NZLR 588. 
187 David Shichor and Dale K Sechrest above n IOI , at 286. 
188 Neil Morgan, above n 2. 
189 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(a). 
190 Ministery of Justice Sentencing Policy and Guidance A Discussion Paper (Wellington 1997). 
19 1 Andrew Ashworth , above n 167, at 82. 
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approp1iate may also vary from one person's to another's.
192 This theo1y wants to 
balance wrongdoing with punishment, thus propo1tionality in punishment becomes 
necessaiy. 1
93 The person of the offender and the particular offence become the 
dete1mining factors in the sentencing decision.
194 Other factors like the hann done or the 
culpability of the offender, the motives of the offender and circumstances of the offence 
needs to be taken into account.
195 An expression of every society what kind of offences 
it sees as more serious and what offences it sees less serious are their penalty scales. 
Different countries have different a11cho1ing points for their penalty scales.
196 
The three st1ikes law could be seen as the view of the society that for each of the 
qualified offences, the maximum penalty is the appropriate penalty for a third offending. 
It was a decision of the public to elect the paities which included the three strikes law in 
their election prograin. However, it is in question if the three st1ikes law is really an 
expression of the will of the society or rather more a political instrument. As seen above 
the introduction of the three strikes law was guided by rhetoric of ,,big slogans". It is in 
question if the public really wants a law disregai·ding the individual case or if it just 
believed that this kind of law will "fight the crime". 
However, a dese11 based sentencing is designed to promote proportionality and 
consistency in sentencing.
197 Just dese1t requires propo1tionality. This is one of its basic 
principles. This means that it is necessaiy to find the 1ight punishment for every offence. 
And therefore it is necessa1y to regard the particulai· offence, the person of the offender 
and the pa11icula1· circumstances. The three strikes law does not fulfil these 
requirements. It rather disregards them. Especially the third st1ike is a general 
punishment, which disregards any individual circumstances. Because of that the three 
strikes law is inconsistent with the just dese11 theo1y. 
D Rehabilitation 
Another purpose of sentencing is "to assist in the offender's rehabilitation and 
reintegration" .
198 The aim of rehabilitation is to transfonn the offender into a valuable 
member of society. It will reduce future crimes by changing the behaviour and the skills 
192 Ibid, at 85 . 
193 Bruce Robe11, above n 165 . 
194 Ibid . 
195 Ibid. 
196 Andrew Ashworth , above n 164 , at 85 . 
197 Neil Morgan, above n 2, at 276. 
198 Sentencing Act 2002 , s 7(h) . 
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of the offender.
199 Also, imprisonment can be used as a f01m of rehabilitation. Here, the 
offender might be "re-educated". This goal of sentencing was the aim with the most 
support in two polls in 1994 and 1985 in New Zealand.200 Helpful for rehabilitation is 
also the possibility of parole. So it is possible to give the offender a motivation to change 
his behaviour and work with the people in prison .. If offenders cooperate and try to 
change themselves, an early release becomes possible. Fwthe1more conditions of release 
can support rehabilitation. Moreover, it is a motivation for an offender on parole to not 
commit any crimes because otherwise the parole will be revoked. 
The three strikes regime does not have the aim of rehabilitation. It will deter and protect 
the public by shutting offenders away. But it will not change the offender. Even the first 
and the second strike do not have the aim to rehabilitate, they will rather deter. 
But in some cases rehabilitation is the best way to protect the public.
201 Sometimes, it is 
necessary to weight rehabilitation higher than deteITence or incapacitation.
202 This is 
unregarded by the legislator. 
The three strikes law has the goal to protect the public. But it disregards the opportunity 
to protect the public by good rehabilitation work. 
E Restitution 
Restitution is a victim-oriented theo1y of punishment. It will "provide for the interests of 
the victim of the offence [and] provide reparation for haim done by the offending".
203 It 
is based on the premise that "the offender should put right the wrong done by his or her 
conduct".204 Restitution might be a reparation or compensation order by the court or an 
apology. Also possible is that the offender pe1fonns a service for the victim or a 
chai·itable body. This aim of sentencing differs from the others because its focus lies on 
the victim and not on the offender or the society as a whole.
205 Its aim is not to prevent 
future c1ime; it rather focuses on the immediate past offence. Restitution is well 
established in New Zealand, it is manifested with the sentence of reparation, which was 
199 Ministry of Justice, above n 190, at 63. 
200 Ministry of Justice, above n 190 , at 65. 
20 1 Bruce Robertson, above n 165,a t 7 
202 See for example Excell v Police High Court Palmerston North CRI-2009-454-49, 17 February 20 I 0, at 
27. 
203 Sections 7(b)(c) of the Sentencing Act 2002. 
204 Ministery ofJustice, above n 190, at 70. 
205 Bruce Robeti on, above n 165 . 
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established in 1985 in the Ciiminal Justice Act 1985 .
206 Quite often, retribution 1s 
imposed along with another sentence. 
The critique on restitution is sometimes that it has another in
tention than the other 
sentencing purposes and that it is more comparable and closer to t
o1t law. 
However, the three strikes law has nothing to do with retributi
on. It does not aim at 
being a compensation for the hmm. Rather it can have the opp
osite effect. So it was 
mentioned by Lianne Dalziel and Cat1nen Sepuloni, both from th
e Labour Patty, in the 
parliatnent debate that Bill does not protect victims, but rather t
hat it would make the 
situation for them worse because the offenders and especially s
uch who m·e convicted 
because of murder would not plead guilty anymore becau
se of the mandato1y 
sentence.20
7 Because of that the risk that the decision process takes longer.
 Then the 
victims are longer confronted with the case. Furthe1more the p
ossibilities of appeals 
against the orders relating to imprisonment in s 86H Sentencing 
Act 2002 enlarges the 
possibility of longer confrontation of the victim with the case. 
Thus the three strikes law is not compatible with restitution. 
VII Conclusion 
The three strikes law breaches s 9 of the NZBORA. Section 86D 
Sentencing Act 2002 is 
a dispropo1tional punishment in the sense of the NZBORA. 
Furthennore, it is not 
compatible with most of the sentencing goals and purposes. Its d
eten-ence effect seems 
to be questionable; it is not compatible with the just dese1t theo1i
es and it does not have 
the goal ofrehabilitation or restitution. 
The three strikes law has changed immensely from the first intro
duced Bill to the final 
Act. A lot of things where changed for the good. However, the t
hree strikes law is still 
unjust. It is a more of a step back than of a step forward. It is 
a political way to ease 
public concerns and the loud voices that cry for hm·der punishmen
ts. 
The classic instruments of sentencing are enough to fight crime. I
t is already possible to 
give hat·d sentences to worst offenders. Eve1y judge is free to give
 the maximum penalty 
206 M ini stery of Justi ce, above n 190, at 72. 
207 (25May 2010) 663NZPD 10903. 
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if he or she thinks that it fits the case or if he or she thinks it is necessary to protect the 
public against this pa11icular offender or to deter him or others. Furthermore, the will of 
the legislator for harder penalties is already laid down in s 8 of the Sentencing Act, 
which states that if the court thinks that this case is one of the worst of this offence, they 
must give the maximum penalty. 
An instrument like the three strikes law is absolutely not necessary to bring "the worst of 
the worst offenders" to justice. The only thing which it does is bringing injustice. 
48 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
A Legislation 
1 New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Crimes Act 1961. 
Humman Rights Act 1993. 
Parole Act 2002. 
Sentencing Act 2002. 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (17-1). 
Sentencing and Parole Refonn Bill 2009 ( 17-2). 
Sentencing and Parole Refo1m Bill 2009 ( 17-3). 
2 Other 
Eight Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
B Cases 
49 
1S. 
49 
1 New Zealand 
Cartwright J in Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission 
(1998] 2 NZLR 218; (1997) 4 HRNZ 37 (HC). 
Excell v Police High Court Palmerston North CRI-2009-454-49, 17 February 2010. 
Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1. 
Taunoa v Attorney-General (2008] l NZLR 429 (SC). 
2 Other Cases 
Ewing v California, 538 US 11 (2003). 
Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957 ( 1991 ). 
Miller and Cockriel! v The Queen ( 1977). 
R v Goltz (1991] 3 SCR 485. 
R v Latimer [2001] 1 S C R 3. 
R v Morrissey [2000] 2 SCR 90. 
R v Oakes [ 1986] 1 SCR l 03 (SC). 
R v Ward (1976] NZLR 588. 
R v Smith, (1987] 1 SCR 1045. 
Rummel v Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
Solem v Helm, 463 US 277 (1983). 
EGMR 18 January 1978 NJW 1979, 1089. 
50 
3 Other official Sources 
a HANSARD 
(18 February 2009) 652 NZPD. 
(4 May 2010) 662 NZPD. 
(18 May 2010) 663 NZPD. 
25 May 2010 664 NZPD. 
b Submissions to select committees 
Amnesty International "Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009" . 
c others 
Christopher Finlayson "Interim Repo11 Attorney General under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 on Sentencing and Parole Refonn Bill 2009". 
Supplementary Order Paper 2010 (123) Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17-1 ). 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
A Texts 
Ashwo11h, Andrew Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4
th 
edition, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005). 
Brookers Commentary Human Rights (online ed) <www.brookersonline.co.nz>. 
51 
of 
. ty 
51 
Buttler, Andrew and Buttler, Petra The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commenta,y 
(Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2005). 
Finkel, Norman J Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law (Harvard University 
Press, Harvard, 2001). 
Goppinger, Hans Kriminologie (CH Beck, Miinchen 2008). 
Hall, Geoff Sentencing Law and Practice (Lexis Nexis Wellington 2004). 
Hickey, Thomas Taking Sites Clashing Views in Criminal Justice (McGraw-Hill 
Contemporary Leaming Series, 200 l ). 
Meyer-Ladewig, Jens Kommentar zur Europiiischen Menschenrechtskonvention (2nd 
ed, NOMOS, Baden- Baden 2006). 
Meyer, Jurgen Kommentar zur Charla der Grundrechte der Europiiischen Union (2nd 
ed, NOMOS, Baden- Baden 2006). 
The Ministry of Justice The Handbook of the NZBORA (Wellington, 2004). 
The Ministry of Justice Sentencing Policy and Guidance A Discussion Paper 
(Wellington 1997). 
Rish worth, Paul The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press 2002). 
Robertson, Bruce Adams on Criminal Law (4
th student edition, Wellington 2005, 
Thomson Brookers). 
Robertson, Bruce (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (on line ed) 
<www.brookersonline.co.nz> . 
Shichor, David and Sechrest, Dale K Three Strikes and You 're out Vengeance as public 
Policy (I st ed, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1996). 
52 
Zimering, Franklin and Hawkins, Gordon and Kamin, Sam Punishment and Democracy 
- Three Strikes and You 're out in California (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 200 I). 
B Journal Articles 
Warren Brokbanks and Richard Ekins "Criminal injustice and the proposed "three 
strikes" law" w (2010) maxime institute <www.maxim.org>. 
Butler, Andrew and Shaerf, James "Limiting fundamental rights: how on ea11h is s 5 
supposed to work in practice?" NZLS Intensive July 2008. 
Carpenter, Craig "Three Sttikes and You 're Out in New Zealand: Getting tough on 
violent c1ime or get tough political rhetoric?" (20 I 0) Rethinking Crime and 
Punishment, <www .rethinking .o rg .nz>. 
Helland, Etic and TabatTOk, Alexander "Does Three St,ikes Deter? A Nonparametric 
Estimation" The journal of Human Resources XLII 2 310-330. 
Hinds, Lyn "Three strikes and you 're out in the west: A study of newspaper coverage of 
crime control in Western Australia" (2005) 17 Criminal Justice 240. 
Jones, Bill "Why the three strikes Law is working in California" (1999) 11 Stan L & 
Pol 'y Rev 23. 
Klinger, Sophie "Three Strikes for New Zealand? Repeat Offenders and the Sentencing 
and Parole Reform Bill 2009" (2009) 15 Auckland UL Rev 248. 
Turner, Susen and Grenwood, Peter W. "The In1pact of truth-in sentencing and three 
strike legislation- Ptisons Populations , states, bugets and crime rates" (I 999) 11 Stan L 
& Pol'y Rev 75. 
Luke Neal and Mirko Bagaric "After Three St1ikes- The Continued Disc1iminatory 
Impact of Sentencing System Against Indigenous Australians: Suggested Reform" 
Volume (2002) 26 C1iminal Law Journal 279. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON UBRARV 
53 
cy 
: of 
L& 
cmg 
hree 
mL 
1tory 
nm" 
53 
Mize, Selene "Indirect Discrimination Reconsidered" (2007) 1 NZLRev 27. 
Morgan, Neil "Capturing Crimes Or Capturing Votes? The Aims And Effects Of 
Mandato1ies" (1999) 22 UNSW Law Journal 267. 
New Zealand Law Society "Lawyers urged to study 'Three Strikes' law" (2010) Law 
Talk 753. 
New Zealand Law Society "Strike out three strikes bill, NZLS says" (2009) Law Talk 
731. 
McCoy, Candace and Krone, Tony "Mandatory Sentencing: Lessons From The United 
States" (2002) JLB Vo! 5 Issue 17. 
Russell, Nick "The New Proposed Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill" (2010) NZ 
Lawyer. 
Vitielo, Michael "Three Strikes Law- a real ore imagined deten-ent to crime" (2002) 29 
Hum Rts 3. 
Janiskee, Brian P. and Erler, Edward J. "Crime, punishment, and Romero: An Analysis 
of the case against California's Three Strikes Law" (2000) 39 Duq L Rev 43. 
C Other Sources 
1 News Paper 
Cheng Derek "Three st1ikes' net becomes wider'' NZ Herald (New Zealand 5 April 
20 I 0) <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
Easton, Paul "Three strikes 'means nothing to lose"' The Dominion Post (New Zealand, 
29 May 20 I 0) <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
Spiegel Online ,,Debatte um Jugendstrafrecht Koch warnt vor kriminellen Auslander" 
(2007) <www.spiegel.de>. 
Gower, Patrick "Three-st1ike law may breach 1ights" NZ Herald (New Zealand, 2 March 
2009) <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
Kay, Mrutin "Three strikes law passes" The Dominion Post (New Zealand 25 May 
2010) <www.stuff.co.nz >. 
Hone Hru·awira, "Sentencing and Pru·ole Reform Bill Speech: The Maori Party" Scoop 
(New Zealand, 5 May 2010 <www.scoop.co.nz>. 
NZPA "Law Society slan1s three strikes bill" (New Zealand 6 May 2009 
<www.stuff.co.nz>. 
Patrick Gower "Three-strike law may breach rights" (New Zealand 2 March 2009) New 
Zealand Herald <www.nzhearald.co.nz>. 
2 Internet Materials 
Brian Brown and Greg Jolivette ,,A Primer: Three Strikes - The Impact After More Than 
a Decade" (2005) Legislativ Analyst Office <www.lao.ca.gov>. 
Committe on the Eliimination of Racial Discriminatiion of Australia "Concluding 
observation by the Comrnitte on the Eliimination of Racial Discriminatiion; Australia" 
CERD/C/56/Misc.42/rev.3 (2000) <www.faira.org.au> . 
Ministry of Justice "The Guidelines on the NZBORAl 990: A Guide to the Rights and 
Freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act for the Public Sector" (November 2004) 
<www.justice.govt.nz>. 
Ministry of Justice "Questions and Answers" <www.justice.govt.nz >. 
Ministry of Justice "Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill No parole for worst repeat 
violent offenders and worst murder cases" (New Zealand, 5 December 2008) 
<www.justice.govt.nz >. 
Ministry of Justice "Final Approval for Introduction of Sentencing and Pru·ole Reform 
Bill (New Zealand, 22 January 2009)" <www.justice.govt.nzp>. 
55 
eh 
ay 
op 
09 
:w 
1an 
and 
04) 
Jeat 
)08) 
CHID 
55 
Minist1y of Justice "Final Approval for Introduction of Sentencing and Parole Reform 
Bill" (New Zealand, 28 January 2009) <www.justice.govt.nz >. 
Ministty of Justice "Worst repeat violent offender policy" (New Zealand , 5 Febmary 
2009)" <www.justice.govt.nz >. 
Minist1y of Justice "Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill : "Final Approval for 
Introduction" (New Zealand, 12 Februaiy 2009)" <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
NZPA "Justice Ministry slams three strikes changes" the National Business Review 
(New Zealand, 22 February 2010 <http://www.nbr.co.nz>. 
RECAP "Three Strikes - Future, Present and Past" (2010) RECAP Newsletter, issue 73 
<http://www.rethinking.org.nz/Print_Newsletters/Issue_73.pdf>. 
US Department of Justice "Criminal Victimization 2000: Changes 1999-2000 with 
Trends 1993-2000" (2001 ). Repo11 NCI 187007 Bureau of Justice Statistics 
<www.ojp.usdoj.gov>. 
56 
A~7!.t' 
vu.vJ 
~bb 
y {;-lj { 
1111111 1,~~r 11r 1111r,,1r11,1,1 11 1,,r,11,~r111111r 111 ,~~ 111,1,1,11111111 
3 7212 01607345 2 
